ABSTRACT We use a general equilibrium model to analyse the employment effects and fiscal cost of a wage subsidy in South Africa. We capture the structural characteristics of the labour market with several labour categories and substitution possibilities, linking the economy-wide results to a micro-simulation model with occupational choice probabilities to investigate the poverty and distributional consequences. The employment impact depends greatly on the elasticities of substitution of factors of production, being very minimal if unskilled and skilled labour are complements in production. The impact is improved by supporting policies, but the gains remain modest if the labour market is rigid.
I. Introduction
Reducing unemployment is a major policy concern in South Africa. Despite a recent improvement in economic growth, unemployment in South Africa is still high, at 26. 7 per cent in 2005 7 per cent in (StatsSA, 2006 . 1 Using a broader definition of unemployment to include discouraged workers, unemployment in South Africa has roughly doubled since the transition from apartheid, to about 30 per cent for men and 38 per cent for women (Levinsohn, 2008) . Employment growth, at 2.1 per cent per year, is slow relative to labour force growth and therefore insufficient to deal with the severity of the unemployment problem (Bhorat, 2001) .
One policy option being debated is a wage subsidy scheme. The South African labour market illustrates an interesting economic issue that is relevant to many developing countries -if there are wage and labour market rigidities in the economy, would a wage subsidy be able to reduce high structural unemployment? Using the particular institutional situation of South Africa, this paper investigates the circumstances under which a wage subsidy would generate significant employment effects. The analysis uses an economic framework that combines a general equilibrium model commonly used in public finance to look at fiscal, welfare, and economy-wide effects of a policy change, and a micro-simulation model with occupational choice probabilities to examine the employment and distributional consequences at the micro level. The link and reconciliation between the two modules is essentially a recursive top-down iteration. 2 Model simulations are used to assess the likely impact of a wage subsidy on unemployment and its sensitivity to the relative complementarity or lack of substitution among factors of production and to the labour market conditions in South Africa. The paper examines several issues: (1) Under what circumstances will a wage subsidy be effective or ineffective in reducing unemployment, particularly for the labour categories of unskilled or semi-skilled workers where unemployment is concentrated? (2) How significant are the welfare and equity impacts on heterogeneous households and on particular groups of labour and households? (3) What are the fiscal and economy-wide repercussions? (4) In a worst case scenario, can the employment effects of a wage subsidy be enhanced with other supporting measures such as skill upgrading (an increase in the supply of skilled labour) or an increase in output of low-skill labour intensive sectors? 3 This work extends a recent computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the wage subsidy issue in South Africa in Pauw and Edwards (2006) by incorporating the following additional features in the model: (1) cross substitution among labour categories is differentiated using a translog (instead of a traditional nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)) formulation, which allows for different degrees of substitution (relative complementarity) between higher-skilled and lower-skilled labour in various sectors, closer but different substitution among lower-skilled labour in different sectors, and greater but different degrees of complementarity between high-skilled labour and capital in various sectors; (2) the addition of the micro-simulation model allows for full household and labour heterogeneity in the welfare and equity analysis of policy reforms by making use of the rich information contained in the household and labour force surveys, for example, for greater earning differences due to individual labour characteristics (education, experience, age, gender, urban-rural distinctions, and so on); and (3) the combination of the wage subsidy and complementary policies. To deal with parameter uncertainty due to the lack of reliable empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution among factors of production, we evaluate the impact of a wage subsidy over alternative sets of low, medium, and high elasticities (see Section III and the Online Appendix).
The paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the unemployment situation in South Africa and reviews the economic justifications for a wage subsidy; Section III provides an overview of the economic modelling framework, with emphasis on its distinctive aspects, the labour market situation and the implementation of wage subsidy; Section IV discusses the simulations and results; and Section V draws general conclusions.
II. Wage Subsidy and Unemployment in South Africa
Why is Unemployment High in South Africa?
Several causes of unemployment are cited in the extensive literature on South Africa's labour market. Bhorat and Leibbrant (1996) , Kingdom and Knight (2004) , Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2005) and Banerjee et al. (2007) provide a good overview. In summary, these causes include:
. The lack of labour demand is often attributed to weak economic growth, especially during the 1970s to the 1990s -Fallon and Pereira da Silva (1994), Standing et al., (1996) , Bhorat (2001) and Lewis (2002) . . Structural change of the economy led to a production decline in tradable sectors where employment is traditionally generated. The non-tradable sectors such as finance and business services grew the most, but they are primarily skilled labourintensive (Fedderke et al., 1999; Edwards, 2001; Hausmann, 2008; Rodrik, 2006) . . The long-term increase in real wages directly dampens labour demand, a significant factor in the lack of employment growth of among unskilled and semiskilled workers (Lewis, 2002 ).
4
. Post-apartheid protection of labour, minimum wage and other labour policies, have increased both indirect non-wage labour costs and labour market rigidities through reduced labour mobility, increased frictions to exits from employment, as well as the additional cost of compliance to labour regulations and of the negotiation processes with labour unions (Nattrass, 2000; Moolman, 2003) .
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. High concentration ratios in the output markets limit competition and investment, thus reinforcing the slow growth of employment in the formal sector (Aghion et al., 2006; Fedderke et al., 2006; Hausmann, 2008) . . Recent studies emphasise the important links between structural issues and unemployment. Low substitution possibilities (relative complements) between skilled labour and unskilled labour make it difficult to expand employment of unskilled labour when production and/or labour markets are rigid, see Hausmann (2008) and Levinsohn (2008) . There may be high reservation wage and job search costs due to transportation costs and geographical distance between where many of the unemployed reside and where firms are located, see Poswell (2002) and Kingdom and Knight (2004) . Significant within-household income transfers and the availability of the old age pension mitigate the necessity for immediate employment in the dual economic structure (Moll, 1993; Dinkelman and Pirouz, 2002; Banerjee et al. 2007 ). Hysteresis and persistence mechanisms, factors important to the high unemployment in OECD countries, also point to the likelihood that a sustained period of high unemployment caused by weak aggregate demand can in turn cause a deterioration in the supply side of the economy, resulting in the long-term unemployed being detached from the labour force and a higher equilibrium unemployment rate. 6 Why a Wage Subsidy?
Because of the structural rigidities in South Africa's labour market, a wage-subsidy policy intervention has become increasingly attractive. Using a careful empirical analysis of individual level changes and transitions in the labour market status observed from an extensive nationally representative panel of individual workers, Banerjee et al. (2007) conclude that, because of the structural changes in the economy, South Africa's high level of unemployment is an 'equilibrium' phenomenon. The decade-long high levels of unemployment appear to be a Wage Subsidy and Labour Market Flexibility 1483 structural rather than a temporary aberration. Such structural unemployment cannot be reduced by macroeconomic management or temporary swings in aggregate demand, but must be addressed by policy interventions affecting labour demand or supply; for example, a wage subsidy, a search subsidy, reduced regulations for first jobs and direct employment by the government. From economic theory, a basic justification for a wage subsidy is that it directly intervenes in the factor market by either stimulating demand for labour (firm-side subsidy) or by increasing labour supply (worker-side subsidy). The employment outcome from a partial equilibrium analysis depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand as shown in two extreme cases in Figure 1 . When unemployment implies a relatively flat (infinitely elastic) supply curve, a wage subsidy to the firm will shift and increase demand by lowering labour cost (Figure 1a) . If the labour supply curve is upward sloping (not shown), the employment effect will be less as wages will rise and the subsidy is shared by firms and workers. In the extreme case, if the supply curve is vertical (completely inelastic) -for example, constrained by a high reservation wage by workers -then a subsidy to the workers will shift supply to the right and increase employment (Figure 1b ). If demand is not completely inelastic, wages will fall to induce the additional demand and the subsidy is shared by firms and labour.
Various empirical studies indicate that the wage elasticity of aggregate labour demand in South Africa tends to be low (particularly in the short term) while labour supply tends to be relatively elastic, suggesting that a wage subsidy to the firm will be more effective as in Figure 1a . See Pauw (2009) for a survey. Furthermore, the brief literature survey above also suggests that weak factor demand, factor input complementarity, and real wage flexibility are the major constraints in the labour market in South Africa. Hence, the demand side will be the main area of investigation in this study.
The economy-wide employment effects of a wage subsidy will also depend on how labour demand in various sectors is affected, the substitution possibilities of different types of labour and between labour and capital, which are all best examined using a Figure 1 . Illustrations of the employment effects of a wage subsidy (2 cases). general equilibrium model. For example, a wage subsidy to less-skilled labour will create jobs by making it cheaper to employ them and effecting a substitution away from higher-skilled labour and capital. Like any relative price change, there will be substitution and output/income effects from a wage subsidy, and the secondary or general equilibrium effects from the interaction of various goods and factor markets in the economy may be important.
Several aspects of a wage subsidy will be not covered given the scope and methodology. This paper does not address the design, implementation and administration costs of a wage subsidy. It leaves the estimation of a reservation wage and pattern of labour market participation of the less-skilled worker for future research. Likewise, it does not address the application of a wage subsidy for offsetting risks associated with employing additional workers with uncertain capability and complementary policies such as training, issues which may be important internationally among more advanced countries.
III. The Economic Framework
To look at the employment effects of a wage subsidy, the distinguishing feature of the analysis is a disaggregated framework, which combines a multi-sector and multilabour computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a micro-simulation model which has wage earnings equations and multinomial logit functions of occupational choices along the line of work such as Bourguignon et al. (2003) , Savard (2003 Savard ( , 2006 and Essama-Nssah et al. (2007) . The link and reconciliation between the two models is essentially a recursive top-down iteration described in more detail in Go et al. (2009) and the Online Appendix.
Economic Structure in South Africa.
The CGE model has 43 production activities derived from a 2003 social accounting matrix. At a broad level, agriculture accounts for 4 per cent of value added, industry accounts for 27 per cent, and services accounts for 69 per cent.
There are three types of labour (formal, self-employed, and informal) and three skill levels (high-skilled, semi-skilled, and low-skilled) within each type of labour. Table 1 shows the distribution of employment by sector and occupation. About six people out of 10 are employed in the services sector. About the same ratio are engaged in formal sector work. With respect to the distribution of skills, the data show that about 12 per cent of those employed are highly skilled; over 45 per cent of labour in South Africa is employed in the low-skilled and medium-skilled formal sector and another 19 per cent in the informal sector. Self-employed and informal sector workers make up about 43 per cent of the total employed labour force. A large proportion of informal labour (including domestic workers) and the self-employed are working in the services sector, which is the biggest employer of the work force and also employs the largest share of high-skilled workers.
Modelling the Labour Market and the Wage Subsidy
Unemployment in South Africa is mainly among low-and semi-skilled workers, individuals largely with primary or less than secondary education. Recent unemployment rates by highest level of education are as follows: without education, 34.4 per cent; incomplete primary, 44.7 per cent; complete primary, 44.9 per cent; incomplete secondary, 50.4 per cent; complete secondary, 39.1 per cent; and in contrast, tertiary, 10.4 per cent (Oosthuizen, 2006) . Minimum wage and other labour policy legislation is designed mainly to protect labour in these groups. For these reasons, unemployment is specified in the model only for low-skilled and semi-skilled formal workers, with sticky real wages. The other labour markets (for high-skilled formal, informal, and self-employed) and the market for capital clear in equilibrium and are assumed to be at full employment. The structural features of the labour markets are treated in a similar fashion as in Lewis (2002), Go et al. (2005) and Essama-Nssah et al. (2007) . All factors are mobile across all production activities with the exception of capital in agriculture, coal, gold, and other mining which is assumed to be activity specific.
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The wage subsidy is introduced as a firm-side subsidy (see above), much like a 'negative wage tax' that lowers the labour cost to employers; it affects only the lowskilled and semi-skilled formal workers where significant unemployment exists, and covers employers in all activities except coal, gold, other minerals, petroleum, and government services. The wage subsidy is paid to all workers -both existing and new hires, as is done in Pauw and Edwards (2006) . With this specification, firms do not have an incentive to fire all existing labour to hire subsidised labour. While not necessarily permanent, the wage subsidy is assumed to be in place long enough for firms to react to it. In relation to a wage subsidy more targeted to new entrants, the results in this paper will likely overstate the fiscal cost but will closely approximate the employment effects at the margin.
Recently, Levinsohn (2008) recommended targeting the wage subsidy to new job entrants, especially the young. In the context of South Africa, however, 76.1 per cent of the unemployed are practically new entrants, defined as those with less than one year or no work experience; close to 85 per cent of unemployed individuals aged 15 to 24 years have never had a job; as have 65 per cent of those 25 to 34 years old (Oosthuizen, 2006) . Hence, a wage subsidy to low-and semi-skilled formal labour will also meet the objective of hiring new workers, the employment effects likely being similar in the two subsidy schemes. The fiscal cost will of course be lower if the wage subsidy is more targeted. Thus, our fiscal estimates are cautious, providing an upper bound to the alternative. This analysis does not consider the additional goals of job training for new entrants, another important area for future research.
Relative complementarity or low substitution among factors of production is a key feature in the model. Each economic activity can use nine labour categories plus capital in production. For reporting purposes, the three skill levels are aggregated into a single input for self-employed and informal labour (as in Table 1 ). In the production technology, it is assumed that substitution possibilities among inputs differ and the following structure is used: (1) it is difficult to substitute low-skilled labour for high-skilled labour in any of the three labour categories; (2) it is easy to substitute across labour categories for the same skill (that is, a high-skilled formal worker is a good substitute for a high-skilled informal worker or a high-skilled self-employed worker); and (3) as the skill level of labour increases, it is more difficult to substitute capital for labour. In the CGE model, this behaviour is represented using a translog production function. 8 The degree of substitution among labour inputs in production is important when measuring what impact a wage subsidy for low-and medium-skilled formal workers will have on unemployment. 9 The cost of the wage subsidy is financed partly by the revenue effect of increased employment and economic activity induced by the subsidy, with the remaining balance paid by (lump-sum) direct or other types of taxes. This follows a standard approach in public finance in which total investment and government spending are fixed in order to isolate the results of the wage subsidy from other macroeconomic adjustment shocks. The macroeconomic closures are described further in the Online Appendix.
Micro-behaviour of Labour and Households
Micro-behaviour of labour and households is employed to examine the distributional or poverty impact of the wage subsidy by using earning functions and employment probabilities by occupational states and according to determinants (such as education, gender, union membership, urban-rural location, head of household, marital status, and so on), which are estimated econometrically (see Korman, 2006) . The top-down link between the CGE and micro-simulation models requires that relative prices, wages, and employment shares by general labour type and broad sector are consistent between the two models. The greater household and labour heterogeneity allows for a better analysis of the impact on income distribution and poverty than is possible from using the CGE model alone due to the latter's aggregation (see below and Online Appendix for details).
IV. Simulations
The employment impact of a wage subsidy will depend on two key factors: (1) the relative complementarity of the factors of production; and (2) labour market constraints due to either a limited amount of skilled labour and capital or the size of the unskilled and medium-skilled intensive sectors in the economy. We devise two sets of simulations to test the sensitivity of a wage subsidy to key factors. We also Wage Subsidy and Labour Market Flexibility 1487 look at the microeconomic impact of a wage subsidy on households assuming the middle range of substitution elasticities in production.
Set 1 of Simulations
Sensitivity of the impact of a 10 per cent wage subsidy to the relative complementarity of the factors of production. Three scenarios assuming low, medium, and high elasticities of substitution between factors of production are performed to illustrate the employment creating potential of a wage subsidy. In the presence of technological constraints and labour market rigidities, the elasticities of substitution would be rather low -as may be the case in South Africa. As technology improves and/or labour market rigidities are removed, the elasticities of substitution should increase and the employment creating potential of a wage subsidy would be larger. 10 For a 10 per cent ad valorem wage subsidy, the employment gains range from 1.9 per cent when the economy is assumed to be inflexible in production to 7.2 per cent when the economy is assumed to be flexible in production ( Table 2) . Agriculture shows a large per centage increase in employment, but given the sector's relatively small share in total employment, the contribution to the change in total employment is relatively low. The employment of low-skilled formal labour in agriculture rises rapidly from 5.1 per cent to 21.2 per cent as the elasticities of substitution increase. Labour that is fixed in total supply (high-skilled formal labour, informal labour, and self-employed labour) is released from the services sector as the economy adjusts to the wage subsidy. Among the macroeconomic aggregates in Table 3 , the increased employment from the wage subsidy leads to increased GDP. For a 10 per cent wage subsidy, GDP increases from 0.6 per cent (low substitution elasticities) to 2.4 per cent (high substitution elasticities).
Although the total fiscal cost of the wage subsidy averages near 20 billion (in 2003 rand), the net fiscal cost depends on the resource or employment effects (see Table 4 ). In the low elasticity case, the effective cost of the wage subsidy is 75 per cent of the total wage subsidy bill. If the economy is more flexible, a higher employment and Wage Subsidy and Labour Market Flexibility 1489 GDP effect will raise more tax revenue to offset the subsidy cost; for example, the effective net cost falls to 55 per cent of the wage subsidy bill in the high elasticity case of substitution. The wage subsidy per job created is relatively high, at R90,758 per job created for the low elasticity case, because the wage subsidy is provided to all low-skilled formal and medium-skilled formal labour hired, not just to the additional workers. The cost per job created declines dramatically as the economy becomes more flexible. Figure 2 shows the sensitivity and positive relationship of the employment and GDP effects to different subsidy rate for the medium elasticity case. Total employment growth ranges from 1.8 per cent for a 5 per cent wage subsidy to 11 per cent for a 25 per cent wage subsidy; the corresponding GDP growth ranges from 0.6 to 3.3 per cent.
The current model specification assumes that the wage subsidy only affects the number employed without affecting the market wages. Alternatively, the presence of labour unions means that some of the wage subsidy is collected by union workers in the form of higher wages. To show the sensitivity of our results to union behaviour, we consider the case in which the union claims half of the wage subsidy in the form of higher wages. Using the medium elasticity values and a 10 per cent wage subsidy, we find that the employment gains are 1.7 per cent, compared to 3.8 per cent in the absence of unions -the employment gains are more than twice as large in the absence of increased wages.
Replacing the implied lump-sum tax with a real tax, we impose a social security tax to finance about two-thirds of the wage subsidy cost. It this scenario, the social security tax pushes the cost of the programme to a subset of household income groups -it is imposed on income groups earning R24,000 and R100,000 to partially finance the wage subsidy. These households are primarily from the income deciles 7 to 9. Lower household deciles do not fall in the tax base and are therefore excluded, while the uppermost household deciles are not considered because the incomes are mainly non-wage. The social security tax is implemented as a direct tax with no incentive effects on the employer; it effectively replaces the implied lump-sum tax necessary to finance the wage subsidy. The direct income tax rate, including the social security tax, goes from 0.087 to 0.117 for the seventh income decile group, 0.108 to 0.146 for the eighth income decile group, and 0.136 to 0.182 for the ninth income decile group; other direct taxes are raised further to finance the rest of the wage subsidy cost, but do not have to increase as much as would be the case without the social security tax. The impact of the financing scheme is evident when looking at household welfare -there is a dramatic decline in the net gains income for the households paying the social security tax. Next, we look at the more detailed impact on households for the medium case of the elasticities of substitution.
Impact on households -medium elasticity case. Looking at the medium case in Table 9 , a wage subsidy to formal sector employers leads to an increase in employment in the formal sector, particularly in the agricultural sector. The importance of the wage subsidy policy is to create new jobs for low-skill and medium-skill formal unemployed individuals in the labour force while encouraging employers to hire new employees with these skill groups and reducing their wage bill. As a result, employment increases by 3 per cent and the new workers are making non-zero wages. While there are differences in earnings of newly employed workers depending on their age, racial composition, and regional disparities, they are beneficiaries of the subsidy scheme since they start making non-zero earnings, are out of the unemployed pool, and as a result their welfare increases. Although real wages are sticky for low-and medium-skilled workers and a wage subsidy is primarily focused on increasing jobs, the sector wages may be affected by the wages of new entrants, depending on their level of experience, education, gender, and so on. For low-and medium-skill workers in the industrial sector, new entrants are drawn primarily from unemployed young black Africans, who tend to have less work experience and less education than a college degree. As a result, there is a decline in the sector wage because new entrants earn much lower than average wages ( Figure 3 ). Workers in agriculture gain from implementation of a 10 per cent wage subsidy policy. There are several reasons. The number of lower-skilled workers is relatively small and the sector wage is easily affected by small changes. Being capital intensive and based on previous employment tendencies, agriculture will tend to employ labour with better experience and education characteristics when compared to other sectors. In many ways, this is untypical of the agriculture and labour market situation of poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The situation in South Africa is also partly due to labour segmentation with employment in agriculture being somewhat insulated from the employment situation in the industry sector or urban area. Average wage gains vary from 2.3 per cent for low-skilled workers to 3.3 per cent for high-skilled workers in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, for lowand medium-skilled workers in the service sector, average wage increases are negligible, while high-skilled workers gain above 2 per cent in the same sector ( Figure 5 ). 12 Overall aggregate income gains for formal-sector workers are still substantial, ranging from 0.6 per cent to 11 per cent, particularly for those in the agricultural and service sectors (Figure 4 ). The total income gains reflect both changes in employment and changes in average wages.
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We also examine the impact of a social security tax imposed on households with income between R24,000 and R100,000 to partially finance the wage subsidy with the proceeds. The households subject to the new tax are in high income deciles (mainly the top three deciles -except the richest decile where the primary income sources are non-wage). As the social security tax is not likely to affect employers' behaviour, there is little impact on the employment level and the structure of the economy from the macro results. As expected, however, there are differences at the household level.
Households are generally better off and their welfare increases with a wage subsidy with or without a social security tax ( Figure 5 ). Relative to the baseline, the imposition of a social security tax affects mainly those households subjected to the new tax -the upper income deciles (7, 8, 9 deciles) . Income gains by household income group range from 2 per cent (for the richest group) to 20 per cent (for the poorest). But with a social security tax imposed on the top three deciles (excluding the richest), the gains will likely disappear for households in these higher three income deciles. For example, households in the ninth decile become net losers from the imposition of social security tax.
Without the microsimulation, the CGE model with multiple (but broadly aggregated) households tends to understate the impact on the poor because of aggregation. For example, the values for household income gains from the microsimulation range from 20 per cent for the poorest to about 2.5 for the richest; the corresponding numbers from the CGE model are much smaller -from about 1.2 to 3.6. The pattern is also not the same; in the CGE model, the richer households gain more than the poor households (see the Online Appendix).
Overall poverty and inequality decline. Table 6 reports the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty headcount ratio. About 1.6 per cent of households move out of poverty with the implementation of the wage subsidy, with the head count ratio declining from 49.1 to 47.6 per cent. 13 The employment effect also offsets the addition of a social security tax with a 1.5 per cent reduction in the poverty rate.
In addition to overall poverty, rural poverty also decreases about 1.5 per cent from 72.1 per cent to 70.6 per cent; urban poverty declines 1.6 per cent. Poorer households gain more than richer households. The decomposition of the head count poverty ratio by population deciles shows that poorer households on average gain more than richer households (see Table 5 ). For instance, the poverty rate falls on average by more than two percentage points for lower deciles of the population. Other potential winners in terms of poverty levels include households with heads completing an education level of grade 7-9, individuals with technical and vocational school degrees and higher-skilled workers. Overall, the differences in poverty rates between the two simulations are minimal. All inequality indicators improve (detailed table available in Go et al., 2009 ). The Gini coefficient declines about half a percentage point from 72 to 71.5 per cent. A similar decline is also observed at the regional level. The magnitudes of these changes are similar in both simulations. While we observe variations from the base case in both simulations, the differences are not significant. Notes: Although there is no official poverty line, the poverty line used here is R211 per person per month, close to the R250 suggested by Statistics South Africa (2000) . This is about US$2 per capita per day in 2000 PPP dollars for private consumption or close to a 1 dollar per day in nominal terms, using the average exchange rate for the year of R 6.95 /1 dollar. See Hoogeveen and Ö zler (2006) and Leibbrandt et al. (2006) for discussion of various data and measurement issues. Simulation 1: 10 per cent wage subsidy given to employers for low-and semi-skill in formal sector. Simulation 2: A social security tax is introduced relative to simulation 1.
Set 2 of Simulations
Sensitivity of the employment effects of a wage subsidy to other structural constraints. The positive impact of the wage subsidy on employment, poverty, and inequality hinges on a critical assumption -that the elasticities of substitution among factors of production are those of the medium case. In the low case, the impact will likely be minimal (see employment effects in Table 2 for example).
Lowering the cost of less-skilled labour to employers with a wage subsidy will not generate an employment kick when factors of production are relatively complementary and the constraint is the supply of skilled workers (or capital). Given concerns that labour markets in South Africa are quite rigid, we consider further sensitivity tests for the low elasticity case, which is close to a Leontief fixed-coefficient technology in some activities. The implicit substitution elasticities, for example, between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and between capital and high-skilled workers in mining, metal products, machinery, vehicles and transport equipment, and so on, are close to 0.12 -a very low degree of substitution (relative complementarity) among these factors or a fairly rigid factor market. In particular, we consider the effect of a wage subsidy given: (1) a 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour; (2) a 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour and capital; and (3) a 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour and capital and a 10 per cent production subsidy to activities with high value added shares in low-skilled and medium-skilled labour. Each of these policies addresses another constraint in South Africa's labour markets. For each of the three interventions, the effect of a marginal increase in the low substitution elasticities among factor inputs in production is also considered. Introducing the measures above also addresses, in a partial or simplified way, some of the second-best effects of a wage subsidy -a wage subsidy essentially introduces a distortion to offset other distortions that have resulted in high unemployment of low-skilled and medium-skilled labour in South Africa. A wage subsidy can be viewed as a short term solution, while the increase in the availability of skilled-labour and capital and the increased substitution possibility among factor inputs addresses the longer-term adjustments. By design, however, the accumulation of skills and capital as well as changes in the substitution elasticities in the simulations are limited to what may be easily attained in the short term in order to test the sensitivity of the wage subsidy to these factors and examine any interesting interactions.
Policy intervention I: 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour. Here, the constraint that there are too few skilled workers is relaxed and the supply is increased by 5 per cent. The amount of change or actual measures for bringing this about are not the focus, but the measures could range from the removal of restrictions on skilled immigrants in the short term or through training programmes in the longer run. For simplicity, we assume that existing public expenditures or training programmes can be realigned to bring this about without additional fiscal cost. The employment impacts of a 10 per cent wage subsidy, summarised in Table 6 , are indeed positive. However, looking at the marginal employment effects of the wage subsidy given the policy intervention (column iv) and comparing them with the 
I. Policy intervention: 5% increase in the supply of skilled labour Set A. Inflexible production structure (low elasticity case) Medium-skilled formal Source: CGE model simulations. Note, for the inflexible production structure (low elasticity case), the substitution elasticities are 0.5* the reference case; for the modest improvement in the flexibility of the production structure, the substitution elasticities are 0.75*the reference case. (See Go et al. (2009) tables with reference values.) reference case of a wage subsidy alone (without the policy intervention), the employment gains (column v) are negligible -very slightly positive for mediumskilled labour and slightly negative for low-skilled labour. This is due to the fact that skilled workers are also highly complementary to capital, which is kept constant.
Policy intervention II: 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour plus 5 per cent growth in capital. This simulation mimics the increase in productive capacity in the economy through capital accumulation or productivity change. Relaxing the capital constraint in addition to skills will bring about a higher marginal employment of a wage subsidy and the employment gains relative to the reference case are clearly positive.
Policy intervention III: 5 per cent increase in the supply of skilled labour plus 5 per cent growth in capital. plus a 10 per cent production subsidy to production activities with high value added shares to low-and medium-skilled formal labour. The output subsidy, in effect, redirects the increase in capital towards more labour-intensive sectors. The targeted sectors are the ones with 40 per cent of value added to either low-skilled formal labour or medium-skilled formal labour, except gold which does not get a wage subsidy. They are: textiles, apparel, wood and wood products, printing, publishing, and recorded media, rubber products, plastic products, machinery and equipment, other transport equipment, furniture, and other producers.
The results are in line with the expected outcomes in most cases. The marginal employment gains relative to the reference case improve with additional policy interventions (and note the policy interventions are cumulative). The only two exceptions are in the low elasticity case. The marginal effect of a wage subsidy on employment, given a 5 per cent increase in skilled labour (policy intervention I) is not better than the effect of a wage subsidy alone -employment for low-skilled labour does increase by 3.3 per cent when there is a wage subsidy in addition to the expansion of the supply of skilled labour. However, this is slightly below the employment gains of a wage subsidy alone. In the model, skilled labour and lowskilled labour are poor substitutes in production. When it is difficult to substitute skilled labour for low-skilled labour, the employment response to a wage subsidy is not as great when there is an additional supply of skilled labour. When the production structure is less rigid (Set B), the wage subsidy has a bigger marginal effect on the employment of low-skilled labour given an increased supply of skilled labour -the marginal gains of a wage subsidy in this environment are 0.16 per cent rather than a decline of 0.13 per cent.
A similar situation arises for medium-skilled labour in policy intervention III for low production substitutability (Set A). In this case, the question is, 'why is the marginal effect of a wage subsidy smaller in the case of policy intervention III compared to policy intervention II?' Since policy intervention III is policy intervention II plus a production subsidy to low-and medium-skilled formal labour, one would expect that the marginal employment gains would be highest with policy intervention III. As specified in the production function (see Go et al., 2009, for values used) , it is difficult to substitute medium-skilled formal labour and capital; as a result, the employment response to a production subsidy to medium-skilled intensive sectors is dampened. When it is easier to substitute medium-skilled formal labour and capital, as is the case in Set B, the results show that the marginal employment effects of a wage subsidy for medium-skilled labour are higher as policy interventions expand. This is not the case for low-skilled formal labour; it is easier to substitute capital for low-skilled labour and the marginal effects of a wage subsidy are higher in policy intervention III than policy intervention II.
Improving Production Flexibility (Set B). For each supporting measure, we also examine the sensitivity of the impact of the wage subsidy under a slight improvement in the labour market flexibility by reducing somewhat the degree of complementarity among factors of production. We do not consider how this may be brought about but suggestions by many include reduction of regulations for new job entrants and for government employment.
The results now show that the marginal employment effects of a wage subsidy are all higher. The employment gains relative to the reference case are also now clearly higher for the increase in skills or other measures. The employment gains of a production subsidy over intervention II are also now established.
Labour market flexibility matters a great deal in determining the employment impact of a wage subsidy, especially in the lower elasticity range. Moreover, for the two sets of lower values of the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and lowskilled labour and between high-skilled labour and capital, the improvement ranges of 0. 
V. Conclusions
The impact of a wage subsidy on unemployment very much depends on the elasticities of substitution of factors of production and on the structural characteristics of the labour market. In the medium elasticity case for South Africa, a wage subsidy will have the intended impact on employment of low-and semi-skilled formal labour and will generate reductions in poverty and inequality. Depending on the elasticities, we find that overall employment gains range from 1.9 to 7.2 per cent. Although a wage subsidy to employers is expensive per job created, because the subsidy goes to all lowand medium-skilled formal labour, the expansion of the labour supply will increase GDP and generate some offsetting tax revenue from existing tax instruments, particularly in the medium and high elasticity cases. The net cost may be financed by a lump-sum tax such as a social security tax, which would have no incentive effects on the employer and would maintain the employment effects.
However, there is much uncertainty regarding the degree of labour market flexibility in South Africa and the impacts on employment, poverty, and inequality will likely be minimal if factors of production are highly complementary to one another, as would be expected with labour market rigidities and structural problems. Under the low range of elasticity values, the employment gains of a wage subsidy may be improved somewhat by supporting policies to relax the skill constraint, to increase the productive capacity of the economy, or to redirect production increases through economic incentives towards labour-intensive sectors.
Nonetheless, the employment gains from the introduction of complementary measures to the wage subsidy in the low elasticity case still appear modest relative to the medium elasticity case. Hence, our view is that labour market flexibility is a critical factor. The combination of a wage subsidy and some marginal easing of the skills and capital constraints and of policies to improve labour market flexibility appears promising as a short-term package of measures towards the long-term solution of the unemployment problem. It is, however, an interim step and the employment effects are quantitatively modest; hence, any enduring effort will require tackling the underlying factors to the unemployment in South Africa.
Although the labour market situation in South Africa is unique in many ways, several potential policy lessons exist because wage and labour market rigidities are present in varying degrees in many developing countries and particularly for middle income or more advanced developing countries capable of implementing a wage or employment subsidy. In assessing the impact of a wage subsidy, it is important not only to account for the direct (partial equilibrium) effects of the policy, but also for its indirect (economy-wide or general equilibrium) effects. In a situation where real wages are sticky and labour supply is relatively elastic, the beneficial effects suggested from partial equilibrium analysis could be large depending on how much the labour demand curve shifts out in respond to subsidy (Figure 1a) . However, our general equilibrium analysis suggests that the overall employment effects may be reduced drastically by a lack of labour market flexibility, which is suggested by the low degree of substitution among labour types and between labour and capital. In other countries, where wages and labour market rigidities are less severe, that is, the elasticities are not as low as in South Africa, the potential employment gains from a wage subsidy will likely be larger. Nonetheless, the poverty impact is clearly positive when we allow for differentiated responses and the introduction of labour and household heterogeneity in the micro analysis. Considering complementary measures to improve the marginal employment effect, the analysis suggests that a piecemeal approach is unlikely to bring substantial gains, that labour market reform has to be sufficiently broad and fundamental to have a significant impact on employment, as emphasised by Coe and Snower (1997) , Orszag and Snower (1998) and Agenor et al. (2007) .
In addition to labour market flexibility, several fundamental factors are suggested by the situation in South Africa and the literature reviewed in the introduction. The presence of high mark-ups and concentration ratios in industries point to the significance of imperfect competition, scale economies, and trade policies in affecting labour market outcomes. The decline of the tradable sector and its employment impact also suggest the importance of Dutch disease or the real exchange rate in a resource rich country. Temporal or dynamic effects of schooling and training on human capital are another set of issues. To this end, the inclusion of imperfect competition and scale economies in a general equilibrium framework is feasible but it will require significant changes in the analysis, as elaborated, for example, by Harris (1984) , Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) and Willenbockel (1994) . The same is true for introducing dynamics, such as adjustment lags, demographic shifts and the accumulation of human capital, particularly at the micro-simulation level. Applying such models to explore employment issues is a potentially fruitful area for further research.
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